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Individual Conscience Under Military Compulsion
by Raymond B. Marcin
The exercise of individual conscience
under military compulsion is an issue
revived by the My Lai courts martial.
Natural law jurists saw a place for
individual conscience, but the
positivist school's dominance
changed that. The Nuremberg
doctrine denied the defense of
superior orders, and now the debate
is raging again.
D URING the recent My Lai courtsmartial, some defendants prof-
fered the argument that whatever was
done at My Lai was done under the
compulsion of the military order of a
superior officer. In another incident, a
young man named Guy Gillette, after
being denied conscientious objector
status, refused military induction be-
cause he considered the Vietnam War
immoral and illegal? These two seem-
ingly unrelated incidents form an un-
likely combination in that they raise
the same question of the individual
conscience under military compulsion.
That question raises an issue so funda-
mental that it must, for the record, be
reviewed from the perspective of legal
history.
The issue of individual conscience
under government compulsion has not
often been the most eager subject of
inquiry for jurisprudence. It was una-
voidable, however, at Nuremberg,
where no defendant was permitted to
escape responsibility for a war crime
by claiming that the act was compelled
by the order of a superior authority.
Article 8 of the Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal provided:
"The fact that the defendant acted pur-
suant to order of his Government or of
a superior shall not free him from re-
sponsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the tribu-
nal determines that justice so re-
quires."
This principle of individual account-
ability, sometimes favorably hailed ac-
cording to the temper of the times, at
other times has lost its shield of popu-
lar support and, standing alone and
unarmed as a rule of law, occasionally
has become an embarrassment. 2 The
question raised by Nuremberg and ex-
panded by subsequent debate is this:
May the individual decide for himself
the morality of a particular command
or even of a particular war?
The Nuremberg precedent was not
new law. The proceedings before the
Supreme Court at Leipzig after World
War I made use of a similar rule
of law. Although the Versailles peace
treaty authorized war crimes trials
by the victorious Allies, it was un-
derstood that the stability at the time
of the Weimar Republic demanded
that the trials of war criminals be
German trials. So it was that the Leip-
zig trials were under German law
and employed Section 47 of the Ger-
man Military Penal Code, providing
that a subordinate may be punished if
he is aware that his superior's orders
directed action which involved a civil
or military crime or misdemeanor. As
it happened, this rule of German mili-
tary law eventually became the Nurem-
berg precedent. Moreover, it has been
called an axiom of English and Ameri-
can law "that the plea of superior
order is no defense to an illegal act".
3
The modern era is not the first time
in which the dilemma of individual re-
sponsibility under military compulsion
has been aired for debate. Augustine
tersely stated and resolved the dilemma
in one sentence: "[A]n unjust order
may perhaps render the king responsi-
ble, while the duty of obedience pre-
serves the innocence of the soldier."
The municipal law of Rome was in ac-
cord with Augustine's approach of ex-
cuse or immunity: "He does the in-
1. Gillette v. United States, argument of
counsel at 39 Law Week 3253 (1970).
2. See United States v. Mitchell, 246 F.
Supp. 874 (D.Conn. 1965). reversed and re-
manded, 354 F. 2d 767 (2d Cir. 1966).
3. 2 GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
WORLD WAR 485 (1920). See also, Mitchell
v. Harmony, 13 How, 115, 137 (1851) : Little
v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 179 (1804), and
Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowper 161, 180
(1774).
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jury, they say, who orders that it be
done; there is then no guilt on the part
of him who has to obey." 4
In the fourteenth century Giovanni
da Legnano, a professor of civil and
canon law at the University of Bo-
logna, commented that soldiers "ought
to obey their generals, because if they
disobey their commands, even in a
good cause, they are punished with
death nonetheless [emphasis sup-
plied]". But he also clearly emphasized
the duty of a subject not to help his
ruler when his ruler was waging an
unjust war against the Church.
5
In an age not known for its attention
to the rights of the individual, the nat-
ural law jurists of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries addressed them-
selves, with commendable earnestness,
to the problem of conscience under
compulsion. Francisci de Victoria, the
Spanish theologian and professor at
the University of Salamanca, drew on
sacred scripture to assert in 1532: "If
a subject is convinced of the injustice
of a war, he ought not to serve in it,
even on the command of his prince.
... [S]ubjects whose conscience is
against the justice of a war may not
engage in it whether they be right or
wrong [emphasis supplied].."
Pierino Belli, Italian statesman and
jurist, felt the weight of the dilemma
when, in 1558, he agreed that "when
the injustice of a lord is clear and
manifest, a vassal is not bound to as-
sist the lord". But he went on to cau-
tion that "it would be a perilous thing
for vassals and subjects to pry into mo-
tives".7
So it was that the ancients, accus-
tomed as they were to the obedience of
a slave to a master, saw little difficulty
in granting immunity to one who acts
unwillingly under the compulsion of a
military order, whereas the early natu-
ral law jurists, concerned as they were
with the "just war", saw of necessity
the stirrings of the individual human
conscience.
Balthazar Ayala, the Dutch lawyer
and military commander, observed in
1582 that "if it chance that [a ruler's]
motive for making war is human
greed, that will not be imputed to the
soldiery as a sin, seeing that they owe
obedience to their prince. . . . [S]ub.
jects may campaign under a pagan and
even heretic commander, unless it be
transparently clear that the war is un-
just; for service is due to God rather
than to man [emphasis supplied]."s
Refrain from Action
If Cause Is Unjust
Of the natural law jurists, the great
Dutch humanist and international law-
yer, Hugo Grotius, gave us in 1625
probably the most complete treatment
to that date of the problem in his De
lure Belli ac Pacis. Stated Grotius: "If
those under the rule of another are or-
dered to take the field, as often occurs,
they should altogether refrain from so
doing if it is clear to them that the
cause of the war is unjust." 9
Grotius cited Victoria and was one
with him in upholding the natural law
right of the individual to decide for
himself whether or not the particular
war is just. His observation that in
"former times men laughed at Strato-
cles who had proposed a law at Athens
that whatever pleased King Demetrius
should be held to be reverent toward
the gods and just among men" seemed
to hold the opposing viewpoint up to
ridicule. The opposing viewpoint did
not, however, escape Grotius's objec-
tive scan: "Pertinent is the saying of
Tacitus: 'To the prince the gods have
given the supreme right of decision;
for his subjects there remains the glory
of obedience.' ... Says Seneca: 'The
slave is not the censorer, but the serv-
ant of his master's order.' "
In full consistency with his declara-
tion of the individual's right to decide
and conscientiously to refrain, Grotius
developed historical precedents for the
individual's right to know. He quoted
Tertullian: "No law must keep to itself
alone the understanding of its upright-
ness, but must impart such knowledge
also to those from whom it expects
obedience." And he punctuated this
with his own view: "Declarations of
war in fact ...were wont to be made
publicly, with a statement of the cause,
in order that the whole human race as
it were might judge the justness of it.
Of a truth wisdom is the virtue charac-
teristic of the ruler ...but justice is
Kula
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the virtue characteristic of a man in so
far as he is a man."
For conscientious objectors Grotius
advocated an exemption not unlike the
substitute purchase system'0 of Civil
War days: "Now if the minds of sub-
jects cannot be satisfied by an explana-
tion of the cause of a war it will by all
means be the duty of a good magis-
trate to impose upon them extraordi-
nary taxes rather than military service.
Grotius's solution to the dilemma of
4. Quoted by GnoTus, DE JURE BELLI AC
PACIs 590, 591 (Classics of International
Law edition, Oxford Press, 1925).
5. DA LEGNAN O, TRACTATUS DE BELLO, DE
REPRESALIIS ET DE DUELLO 234, 236 (Classics
of International Law edition, Oxford Press,
1947).
6. VICTORIA, ON THE LAW OF WAR 173
(Classics of International Law edition,
1917).
7. BELLI, A TREATISE ON MILITARY MAT-
TERS AND WARFARE 63, 65 (Classics of Inter-
national Law edition, Oxford Press, 1936).
8. AYALA, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND ON
THE DUTIES CONNECTED WITH WAR AND ON
MILITARY DISCIPLINE 21, 22 (Classics of In-
ternational Law edition, Oxford Press, 1912).
9. GaOTIUs, DR JuE BELLI AC PACIS 587
(Classics of International Law Edition, Ox-
ford Press, 1925).
10. 12 Stat. 731, 733.
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conscience and the unjust war or un-
just military order represented a some-
what higher degree of humanitarian
sophistication than did the solution of
the Romans. The Romans and others
proposed immunity from prosecution
for the individual who was compelled
to participate in the unjust war or to
perform the unjust act. Grotius, while
noting their proposal, chose for his
own a principle of exemption for con.
scientious objectors-thus not only re-
solving the dilemma but also, and
more important, avoiding the outrage
committed upon the human conscience
by compulsion.
The Spanish scholastic philosopher,
Francisco Suarez, seemed to be in ac-
cord with his contemporary when he
stated in 1612 that "common soldiers,
as subjects of princes, are in no wise
bound to make diligent investigation,
but may go to war when summoned to
do so provided it is not clear to them
that the war is unjust [emphasis sup-
plied]". However, Suarez went on to
qualify his position: "[W]hen the in-
justice of the war is not evident to
these soldiers, the united opinion of
the prince and of the realm is sufficient
to move them to this action. . ...
[S]ubjects when in doubt . . . are
bound to obey their superiors."
Suarez, too, felt the weight of the di-
lemma and seemed to be unable to
focus on it decisively:
[I]f the doubt [as to the justice of a
war] is purely negative, it is probable
that the soldiers in question may
[rightfully] take part in that war with-
out having made any examination of
the question, all responsibility being
thrown upon the prince to whom. they
are subject. . -. If. however, the doubt
is positive, and if both sides advance
plausible arguments, then, in my opin-
ion, [those who are about to enlist]
should make an inquiry into the truth
of the matter. If they are unable to as-
certain the truth, they will be bound to
follow the course of action which is
more probably just, and to aid him
who is more probably in the right."1
Fifty years later Samuel Pufendorf,
the famous international lawyer at the
Universities of Heidelberg and Lund,
foresaw and accurately stated present-
day fears' 2 when, in his Law of Nature
and Nations, he cited Grotius's views
but modified them with his own practi-
cal observation:
[W]e ought to be very cautious how
we determine in this matter about such
things as these, for fear we should
weaken the Force of the Civil Power,
and make the obedience of the subject
in a Matter of so much Importance,
depend upon every particular Man's
Judgment, especially since in this case
it would be easy for a Man to pretend
Conscience only to disguise his Fears
and Cowardice.
13
In the eighteenth century the Swiss
international lawyer, Emmerich Vattel,
penned views which harkened back to
the Roman position when he wrote:
"Soldiers . . . are but instruments in
the hands of their commanders." Pre-
scinding from the lengthy debate over
conscience that had preceded him, Vat-
tel stressed an unequivocal and unqual-
ified duty to obey the sovereign:
The sovereign is the real author of
war, which is made in his name and at
his command. The troops, both officers
and soldiers, and in general all those
persons by whom the sovereign carries
on war, are only instruments in his
hands. They execute his will and not
their own.
Every citizen is bound to serve and
defend the state as far as be is able.
Society cannot otherwise be preserved;
and this union for common defense is
one of the first objects of all political
association.
1 4
Vattel's Law of Nations, written in
1758, marked the first significant
break with the natural law school of
jurisprudence and signaled the ascen.
dency of the positivist school.
15 So it
was that the United States Supreme
Court, in its omnibus decision on the
constitutionality of the Draft Act of
1917. could rely solely on the writings
of Vattel, without a hint of the grand
debate that had preceded them:
It may not be doubted that the very
conception of a just government and
its duty to the citizen includes the re-
ciprocal obligation of the citizen to
render military service in case of need
and the right to compel it. Vattel, Law
of Nations, Book III, c. 1 and 2.'6
It could perhaps be said that the
grand debate of the natural law jurists
on the problem of the individual con-
science under military compulsion died
with the rise of the positivist school of
jurisprudence. But, more accurately
perhaps, it could be said that the grand
debate died for lack of a real forum.
For it was that simple provision of a
real-life forum at Leipzig, at Nurem-
berg and at Vietnam that has revived
that very same debate.
11. SUAREz, A WoRK ON THE THREE THEO.
LOGICAL VIRTUES, DISPUTATION XIII ON WAR
832, 836 (Classics of International Law edi-
tion, Oxford Press, 1944).
12. See Justice Minton's dissent in Sic t-
rella v. United States, 348 U. S. 385, 395
(1955), where he cautions lest one be al-
lowed to "choose the wars in which he shall
fight".
13. PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE
AND NATIONS 782 (Oxford edition, 1703).
14. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 319
(Classics of Internatonial Law edition, Ox-
ford Press, 1916).
15. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76 (1964).




Thought of it for a moment
Went to something else
trembling with apprehension
how could I forget it!
The papers are signed what
a blunder what to do
temples pounding stomach contracting
No excuses
No mistakes can be made
what shall I tell the client!
-EL E. FiNK
Chicago, Illinois
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